whose.one source dossier · v1.0 · 2026-08-24

Southern Kuril Islands — Northern Territories
Source Dossier

The documentary evidence behind both official narratives, with the accessibility of each original noted. Every source carries the other side's rebuttal. This document endorses neither claim.

X Facebook
VOTE Which story do you find more convincing? Naming rule This edition carries both names and leads with Southern Kuril Islands — the form most English-language reference works use, and also the English rendering of Russia’s name, which already places the islands inside the chain Japan renounced at San Francisco. Northern Territories asserts the opposite. There is no neutral name for this ground in any of the three languages: Южные Курилы leads in the Russian edition and 北方領土 in the Japanese, and each of those, like this one, is a rule about the edition’s language rather than a finding on title · The order of the two narrative sections below is randomized on every visit
cited by Russiacited by Japanneutral fact

Current status — as of August 2026 Status as of 2026-08

Change log

Russia conducted a missile test near the islands.

Moscow summoned Japan's ambassador over Tokyo's protests; Deputy Foreign Minister Galuzin said Russian sovereignty was "not in question."

US Ambassador George Glass restated American recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Northern Territories. China's foreign ministry urged Japan not to dispute the outcomes of the Second World War.

Putin visited Iturup — the first visit by a Russian or Soviet head of state to the disputed islands. Japan summoned the Russian ambassador and Foreign Minister Motegi lodged a formal protest.

Peskov: "There is no dialogue, and it is impossible to discuss the issue of a peace treaty without dialogue."

Prime Minister Takaichi attended the Northern Territories Day rally in person, 80 years on, and pressed again for the resumption of grave visits.

Takaichi told parliament that resolving the territorial issue and concluding a peace treaty remains Japanese policy; the Kremlin responded that it too supports a treaty but that dialogue is "reduced virtually to zero."

Russia suspended the right of innocent passage around all four islands for a week; Japan protested.

Citing Japan's participation in sanctions over Ukraine, Russia terminated peace treaty negotiations and the visa-free exchange and grave-visit programmes. Japan called the step "completely unacceptable." Grave visits remain suspended.

The order of the two narrative sections below is randomized on every visit — this dossier takes no side, not even in sequence.

Russia's narrative 6 sources

Priority of survey, then the wartime settlement: the Allies promised the chain at Yalta, Japan accepted whatever the Allies determined, the occupying authority severed the islands from Japan by name, and Japan renounced them by treaty without reservation — as its own Foreign Ministry told the Diet at the time.

Spanberg and Walton's voyages; Russian charts from 1755 1738–39

Russian expeditions under Martyn Spanberg and Walton surveyed and charted the chain in 1738–39, and successive Russian charts from 1755 onward mapped it. Russia holds that its presence in the islands predates any Japanese administration of them.

Meaning
Answers Japan's claim that the four are 固有の領土 — territory "never held by foreign countries." On Russia's account Shimoda in 1855 records a negotiated concession to Japan, not recognition of a pre-existing Japanese title.
Japan rebuts
Priority of survey is not title. Whatever charts existed, the boundary was fixed by agreement in 1855, peacefully and in peacetime, and it placed the four islands on the Japanese side; Japan then held them continuously until 1945. Japan also notes that Russia's own negotiators in 1855 accepted that line.
copies published documented Commons: Пути Шпанберта и Вальтона, 1738-39 годов; Карта Курильских островов 1755 годаNo publicly accessible copy of this source was located; the claim rests on the description given here

The Yalta Agreement 11 February 1945

Signed by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill as the price of Soviet entry into the Pacific war within two to three months of Germany's surrender. The text uses "handed over" for the Kurils and "returned" for southern Sakhalin, which Russia had held until the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. It names no islands individually.

The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
Meaning
Russia's foundational title document: the Allies, the United States among them, promised the whole chain, and the USSR performed its side of the bargain at cost.
Japan rebuts
Japan was not a party and never consented; a secret agreement among three states cannot dispose of a fourth state's territory. Japan further argues Yalta was a statement of common purpose, not an instrument of cession, and that the United States itself later said so. The Japanese Communist Party goes further, calling Yalta "a gross injustice and a flagrant violation of the non-expansion principle" declared at Cairo — attacking its morality, not only its bindingness.
original published documented Russian MFA Foreign Policy Archive scan is public Full text (Avalon, Yale)

Potsdam Declaration Art. 8 and the Instrument of Surrender 26 July / 2 September 1945

Japan accepted the Potsdam terms in the Instrument of Surrender signed aboard the USS Missouri. Russia reads "such minor islands as we determine" as a grant of authority to the Allies collectively — authority they had already exercised at Yalta.

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
Meaning
The bridge argument: Japan consented in 1945 to whatever the Allies decided, and the Allies had decided six months earlier.
Japan rebuts
Cairo, which Potsdam incorporates, expressly disclaims Allied territorial ambition and says Japan will be expelled only from territories "taken by violence and greed" — which cannot describe islands acquired by the peaceful treaties of 1855 and 1875. Japan also reads "such minor islands as we determine" as contemplating a future joint determination, never made, rather than a back-reference to a secret bilateral bargain.

SCAPIN 677 and the USSR Presidium Decree 29 January / 2 February 1946

The Allied directive "Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan" defined Japan so as to exclude all four by name. Four days later the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet created Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Oblast covering southern Sakhalin and the Kurils, and nationalised all land, minerals, forests and waters there retroactive to 20 September 1945.

…excluding the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai (Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku Islands) and Shikotan Island. — SCAPIN 677
Meaning
The occupying Allied authority itself severed all four from Japan by name — including Habomai and Shikotan, which Japan insists were never Kurils at all. Russia has exercised sovereign acts there continuously for eighty years since.
Japan rebuts
SCAPIN 677 Art. 6 expressly states the directive is not to be construed as Allied policy on the ultimate determination of the minor islands under Potsdam Art. 8. It was an administrative measure for the occupation, not a transfer of title. And a unilateral Soviet decree cannot create title over territory the USSR held only by belligerent occupation.
original published documented Both texts published Presidium decrees, 1946 (ru.wikisource)

San Francisco Peace Treaty Art. 2(c) 8 September 1951

Japan renounced the Kurils without reservation and without naming an exception. Russia's decisive supporting evidence is Japanese, not Russian: on 19 October 1951, during ratification hearings, Nishimura Kumao — Director of the Treaties Bureau of Japan's own Foreign Ministry — told the Special Diet Committee that the treaty's "Chishima Rettō" comprised both the Northern and the Southern Chishima, that is, it included Kunashiri and Etorofu.

Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.
Meaning
Japan itself understood, at the moment of ratification, that it was giving up all four. On Russia's account the later carve-out is retrofitted.
Japan rebuts
The USSR refused to sign the treaty and cannot claim rights under an instrument it rejected (pacta tertiis). Art. 2(c) names no beneficiary — Japan renounced to no one, leaving the disposition open. On Nishimura: the Foreign Ministry has called the testimony a mistake and formally revised the government's position in 1961. Gregory Clark's rejoinder is that a treaties-bureau chief misdescribing the central territorial clause during ratification is not a plausible error.
original published documented Diet record published; MOFA calls the testimony an error, revised 1961 Treaty textClark on the Nishimura testimony (FCCJ)

Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration, Art. 9 19 October 1956

передать — to hand over, transfer. Not возвратить — to return.

Art. 9 records that the USSR, "desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty." The Russian verb is передать, never возвратить. Etorofu and Kunashiri are not mentioned. The USSR expressly refused Japanese wording about a "territorial issue" precisely to foreclose reading in further claims.

Meaning
The maximum Russia has ever offered, and its ceiling: two islands, as a discretionary concession after a treaty, not restitution of anything wrongly held. Peskov reaffirmed in 2018 that returning to the 1956 basis "implies no transfer of Russian territories."
Japan rebuts
The Declaration was ratified by both parliaments and is a binding treaty; Japan reads Art. 9 as a floor, not a ceiling — it settles two islands and leaves the other two to the peace-treaty negotiations the same article mandates. Japan also notes that the USSR broke it first: in January 1960, after the revised US–Japan Security Treaty, Moscow made even the two-island transfer conditional on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japan — a unilateral amendment of a ratified treaty, which Japan formally rejected.
original published documented Joint Declaration text

Japan's narrative 6 sources

Two peaceful nineteenth-century treaties fixed the border and defined what "Kuril Islands" meant; the Allies disclaimed territorial gain; the islands were taken after the surrender in breach of a pact still running; and the instrument Russia relies on is one the USSR refused to sign.

Treaty of Shimoda 7 February 1855

Отныне границы между Россией и Японией будут проходить между островами Итурупом и Урупом.

日露和親条約 / Симодский трактат, signed by Putyatin for Russia. Art. 2: "Henceforth the boundary between Russia and Japan shall pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup. The whole island of Iturup belongs to Japan, and the whole island of Urup and the other Kuril Islands to the north constitute a possession of Russia." The first Russo-Japanese border, drawn in peacetime with no war and no coercion. All four islands fall on the Japanese side by the treaty's own terms.

Meaning
The bedrock claim: the four are 固有の領土 (koyū no ryōdo, "inherent territory") which have never been held by a foreign country. Japan made 7 February Northern Territories Day (北方領土の日) to fix this date in public memory.
Russia rebuts
Russians surveyed and charted the chain first, and Shimoda records a negotiated concession rather than recognition of prior Japanese title. More sharply: whatever 1855 settled, the 1945 settlement superseded it. Russia treats the pre-war treaties as legally spent — terminated by the state of war and replaced by the Allied disposition.
original published documented Manuscript copy at the National Diet Library (DOI 10.11501/11125297) Manuscript copy, National Diet Library

Treaty of St Petersburg 7 May 1875

樺太・千島交換条約, signed by Gorchakov and Enomoto Takeaki. Japan ceded all of Sakhalin; Russia ceded the Kurils. The treaty then enumerates the eighteen islands transferred — from Shumshu in the north down to Urup, and no further. The authentic text is French; the Japanese text renders the ceded group as クリル群島 (Kuriru guntō), not 千島列島 (Chishima rettō).

le groupe des Îles dites Kouriles qu'Elle possède actuellement
Meaning
Japan's sharpest documentary card. The treaty itself defines what "Kuril Islands" meant to both parties in 1875: eighteen named islands beginning at Urup. Etorofu and Kunashiri are absent because Russia could not cede what it did not have — Japan had held them since 1855. So when San Francisco says "Kurile Islands," the parties' own prior definition excludes the four. The Japanese text has no official treaty status — the French governs — so the クリル / 千島 wording is evidence about how Japan understood the term, not a binding textual argument.
Russia rebuts
The restrictive clause qu'Elle possède actuellement is ambiguous in the French — it can limit which islands Russia was then holding rather than define the geographic extent of "les Îles dites Kouriles." A treaty describing an 1875 transfer cannot bind the meaning of an unrelated 1951 multilateral treaty drafted in English by American lawyers. And Japan's own Treaties Bureau chief said in 1951 that Chishima included the south.
copies published documented The authentic text is French and no accessible public repository of it was located for this page; the treaty is therefore cited through a contemporary United States diplomatic dispatch reporting its conclusion, which summarises the exchange in one sentence and carries no articles.This matters beyond sourcing: the divergence between the French text and its Japanese translation is itself part of the modern dispute over what "the Kuril Islands" names. Contemporary US dispatch reporting the treaty (FRUS 1875, vol. II, doc. 206)

Cairo Declaration — the non-expansion principle 1 December 1943

Cairo, which Potsdam Art. 8 expressly incorporates, disclaims any Allied territorial ambition and limits Japan's expulsion to territories "taken by violence and greed." Japan argues that formula cannot describe islands acquired by the peaceful negotiated treaties of 1855 and 1875.

…expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.
Meaning
Supplies the internal contradiction inside the very Allied documents Russia relies on: Potsdam incorporates Cairo, and Cairo forbids the territorial expansion Yalta promised.
Russia rebuts
Potsdam's operative sentence is "such minor islands as we determine" — the Allies reserved the determination to themselves, and they made it. Russia also treats the four as gains of Japanese expansion in the north rather than as innocent acquisitions, and holds that the wartime settlement replaced the nineteenth-century treaties entirely.

The Neutrality Pact and the calendar of the occupation April – September 1945

The USSR denounced the 1941 Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5 April 1945 while telling Tokyo it would remain in force a further twelve months, then declared war in August. The Kuril landing operation began 18 August, after Japan's capitulation broadcast. Kunashir and Shikotan were assaulted on 1 September. The five Habomai islets were taken on 4 September — two days after the Instrument of Surrender was signed. Japan's official figure is that 17,291 residents were expelled between 1945 and 1949.

17,291 residents expelled, 1945–49 — Japanese government figure
Meaning
Japan's occupation-legality argument, and the emotional core of the domestic case: islands seized after the war was over, in breach of a pact Moscow had said was still running, and a population removed.
Russia rebuts
The Neutrality Pact was lawfully denounced under its own terms, and Japan had itself repudiated its spirit by belligerence toward Soviet allies. Combat does not end at a broadcast — Japanese garrisons in the Kurils fought on after 23 August and Shumshu produced real Soviet casualties. The occupation of the undefended islets in early September completed one authorised campaign rather than beginning a fresh land-grab. Russia commemorates the operation officially, including on a 2020 five-rouble coin.
copies published documented Operational records and Japanese government figuresSources differ on 8 vs 9 August for the Soviet declaration of war Cabinet Office chronology (hoppou.go.jp)

The Tokyo Declaration 13 October 1993

Signed by Prime Minister Hosokawa and President Yeltsin. The Declaration names all four islands as the subject of the negotiations and commits both governments to conclude a peace treaty by resolving their attribution, on the basis of historical and legal facts and of the principle of law and justice. It followed Gorbachev’s April 1991 communiqué, which had first listed the four in a joint document.

…negotiations on the question of the attribution of the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands.
Meaning
The first written Russian acknowledgement that the territorial question covers four islands and not two — Japan’s direct answer to the position that no dispute exists. Irkutsk (2001) and Singapore (2018) continued the same negotiating track.
Russia rebuts
A declaration of intent to negotiate is not a concession of title; naming the islands under discussion concedes only that Japan raises them. Russia holds that the 1956 Declaration remains the sole binding instrument on any transfer, and that the negotiating record since 1991 has been overtaken by Japan’s alignment with sanctions and, since 2020, by the constitutional bar on alienating territory.
original published documented Tokyo Declaration text

Yoshida at San Francisco — Habomai and Shikotan as Hokkaidō 7 September 1951

Prime Minister Yoshida said this to the San Francisco conference the day before signing the treaty. It states Japan’s separate and stronger track on two of the four islands: Habomai and Shikotan are not Kurils on any reading — they are an extension of Hokkaidō — so Art. 2(c) never reached them whatever “Kurile Islands” means.

Even the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, constituting part of Hokkaido, one of Japan’s four main islands, are still being occupied by Soviet forces.
Meaning
Splits the dispute in two. Even a reader persuaded that Etorofu and Kunashiri were renounced in 1951 still has to account for Habomai and Shikotan — which is also why the 1956 Declaration singles out exactly those two.
Russia rebuts
SCAPIN 677 had already separated Habomai and Shikotan from Japan by name five years earlier, so the Allied authority plainly did not treat them as part of Hokkaidō. Russia administers them within the Lesser Kuril Ridge, and notes that Japan’s own four-island framing places them in the Kuril chain when the wider claim requires it.
original published documented Conference record published San Francisco conference record

Same text, two readings 3 battlegrounds

Where the two sides read the very same document in opposite ways — pick a reading and watch the highlighter move. The initial selection is random.

① What "the Kurile Islands" covers — San Francisco Art. 2(c) (1951)

Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.

Unqualified. No exception, no carve-out, no islands named. If the drafters had meant to exclude four inhabited islands they would have said so — they knew how to qualify, because they qualified the Sakhalin clause in the very same sentence. And Japan's own Treaties Bureau chief told the Diet six weeks later that it included the south.

The whole article is about undoing the gains of the 1904–05 war — and the four islands were not such gains; they were Japanese from 1855, before Portsmouth existed. No transferee is named anywhere in the article, and the USSR never signed the treaty at all.

The existence and wording of Art. 2(c) are entirely undisputed. Everything turns on a five-word noun phrase, and on whether a renunciation without a transferee can vest title in an occupant.

② "Transfer" or "return" — Joint Declaration Art. 9 (1956)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty. … The USSR and Japan agree to continue negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.

A ceiling. The verb is передать — to hand over — never возвратить, to return. "Desiring to meet the wishes of Japan" marks a voluntary concession by a sovereign owner, conditioned on a treaty that was never concluded. Two islands named; two not. And since 2020 even that is constitutionally difficult.

A floor. Read together with the same article's obligation to continue negotiating a peace treaty, the clause presupposes unfinished business: it settles two islands and leaves the rest to the negotiation it mandates. Russia then breached it in January 1960 by adding a condition to a ratified treaty.

This is the four-versus-two gap, and each side frames it as the other's bad faith. Japan's account: the text is silent on Etorofu and Kunashiri because they were left to the negotiation, not conceded. Russia's account: two was the offer, and Japan escalated to four under American pressure after Moscow had already agreed. Both accounts are internally coherent — two readings of one silence.

③ What "Kuril Islands" meant in 1875 — Treaty of St Petersburg

le groupe des Îles dites Kouriles qu’Elle possède actuellement1. Shumshu · 2. Alaid · 3. Paramushir … 16. Ketoi · 17. Simushir · 18. Urup

"Which she presently possesses" is a restrictive clause about what Russia happened to hold in 1875 — not a definition of the geographic extent of the Kuril chain. An 1875 bilateral exchange cannot fix the meaning of a word in an unrelated 1951 multilateral treaty drafted in English by American lawyers.

The enumeration settles it. The parties wrote down the eighteen islands being transferred, from Shumshu to Urup — and stopped. Etorofu and Kunashiri are absent because Russia could not cede what it had not held since 1855. That is the parties' own definition of "Kuril Islands," recorded in the authentic French text.

Both sides accept the treaty and its enumeration. The dispute is whether a definition agreed between two states in 1875 travels into a multilateral treaty seventy-six years later.

Third-party views neutral sources

Finding: the neutral legal literature on this dispute is unusually hard to reach — the Max Planck Encyclopedia entry, the Durham IBRU briefing and the main Russian scholarly review are all paywalled or blocked. What follows is what could be verified, with each source's limits stated.

The United States' position since 1956; restated 2026

Washington has explicitly backed the Japanese claim since 1956. Ambassador George Glass restated it on 14 August 2026, the day after Putin's visit to Iturup: "The United States remains unwavering in its support of its most important ally and in its recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Northern Territories." The Russian Foreign Ministry called the statement encouragement of "Japanese revanchism and revisionism."

Value / limits
The clearest great-power endorsement either side has. Its limit is structural: the United States is Japan's treaty ally, and its own archival record (FRUS 1955–57) shows Washington pressing Tokyo toward the four-island position in 1955–56 — so the US is not only an endorser of that position but partly its author.
original published asserted by a government FRUS 1955–57, vol. XXIII pt. 1, doc. 52

The dissenting Japanese position Japanese Communist Party

The JCP rejects its own government's central argument — it accepts that Kunashiri and Etorofu are Kuril Islands, and cites the 1951 Nishimura testimony against the Foreign Ministry. It simultaneously calls Yalta "a gross injustice and a flagrant violation of the non-expansion principle," holds that Art. 2(c) itself violated that principle and should be abrogated, and proposes a two-stage settlement: Habomai and Shikotan by a friendship treaty, then the whole Chishima chain by a peace treaty.

Value / limits
Proof that Japanese opinion is not monolithic — which is precisely what a "different stories" site should record. Its evidentiary weight lies in quoting Japanese official records against the Japanese official position. Its limit: it is a political party's platform arguing for an outcome larger than the government's, so it is not itself a neutral reading.
copies published JCP position paper (English)

The 1955–56 escalation question Gregory Clark, FCCJ, 2016

Clark argues that the Nishimura testimony was not an error, that Japan escalated from two islands to four in 1955–56 under American pressure, and reports a warning from Dulles that if Japan dropped its claim to Etorofu and Kunashiri the United States might retain Okinawa permanently. He also notes that Tokyo has withheld the Yoshida-era protest documents from release.

Value / limits
A dissenting account from inside the foreign-correspondent establishment in Japan, and the fullest statement of the case that the four-island position is a Cold War artefact rather than a legal conviction. Its limits are real: this is opinion journalism, not peer-reviewed work; Clark was a longstanding and openly polemical critic of Japan's Foreign Ministry; and the Okinawa warning rests on reported recollection — the US archival record corroborates the pressure but not that specific formulation.

The 2020 constitutional bar in force 4 July 2020

Amendments approved by nationwide vote prohibit actions "directed towards the alienation of part of the territory of the Russian Federation, and also calls for such actions," with a carve-out for delimitation, demarcation and redemarcation. Criminal Code Art. 280.2, introduced by Federal Law No. 425-FZ of 8 December 2020, attaches six to ten years' imprisonment. RUSI's assessment is that the delimitation carve-out — which Japan initially read as a route permitting a "border demarcation" framing — is not usable in the present political climate.

Value / limits
The structural reason the dispute is frozen rather than merely stalled: any Russian negotiator conceding territory now faces criminal exposure. Note the sequence — the amendments preceded the 2022 rupture and outlast it, so even a full rollback of sanctions would leave the bar standing. Caution: the substantive prohibition is well attested, but the exact clause number of Art. 67 could not be verified against the constitutional text.
copies published documented No publicly accessible copy of this source was located; the claim rests on the description given here

The two official portals for parallel reading

🇯🇵 The Japanese Cabinet Office runs hoppou.go.jp, the source of the official occupation chronology and the 17,291 expulsion figure, alongside the Cabinet Secretariat's territorial-affairs site. 🇷🇺 Russia publishes no equivalent dedicated portal; its position is stated through Foreign Ministry statements and the standing formula that the islands' status is settled by the outcomes of the Second World War and "enshrined in international documents."

Value / limits
The wellsprings of both official narratives — and the asymmetry between them is itself informative: Japan maintains a permanent public-education apparatus for the claim, while Russia treats the matter as closed and therefore not requiring one. Both are government organs, neither is neutral.
Which story do you find more convincing?
Past records are archived forever
counting — split shown once enough votes are in
The frozen record — never edited, never deleted

Method and limits. Compiled 2026-08-24 from a three-track research pass (Russian grounds / Japanese grounds / third parties), with every URL verified live. Two structural cautions specific to this dispute. First, the neutral legal literature is largely unreachable: the Max Planck Encyclopedia entry, Durham's IBRU Boundary & Territory Briefing and the main Russian scholarly review all returned paywalls or blocks, so this dossier leans on primary instruments and on partisan sources read against each other. Second, Japan's four islands and Russia's two ridges are different partitions of the same rocks — "Habomai" and Малая Курильская гряда are not a translation pair, since the Russian Lesser Kuril Ridge includes Shikotan while the Japanese 歯舞群島 excludes it. Any bilingual map must choose, and the choice is already an argument. Badges follow the two grades defined in the editorial principles: original published = images or full text publicly available; copies published / diplomatic record = transmitted otherwise. Where a fact could not be verified it is labelled as such rather than omitted.

Editorial principles. ① Name order follows the language edition: Южные Курилы leads in Russian, 北方領土 in Japanese; this English edition leads with the form reference works use, which is also the English of Russia’s name — there is no neutral name here. ② The order of the two narrative sections is randomized on every visit. ③ Every dispute is labelled with its de facto controller, and every source carries the other side's rebuttal.